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Introduction
It is important that children are raised free from poverty and with full support from their 
families/whänau. However, many children spend some or all of their childhood with their 
parents living apart. Policies aim to limit the harm this might do, with one important but 
controversial aspect being child support. As part of a review of the New Zealand child 
support scheme, a consultation document was released in September 2010 (Dunne, 2010), 
building in part on a paper by researchers in the Inland Revenue Department (IRD) on the 
costs of children (Claus et al., 2009). This assessment paper backgrounds the current child 
support situation and consultation. It then considers aspects of the consultation, namely: (1) 
the estimation of costs of children, (2) the resulting proposed child support formula, and (3) 
broader issues related to child support. General conclusions are then drawn.
Background
The Child Support Act 1991 appears to 
have had fundamental flaws from the start. 
Section 4 of the act lists the objects of the 
legislation. It can be easily demonstrated 
that these objects are not reflected in the 
formula given in the act to compute child 
support payments (Birks, 2000). Briefly, a 
major stated aim of the Act is to ensure 
‘fair’ contributions by parents towards the 
costs of their children. However, among 
other concerns, the basic formula in the 
Act considers only the circumstances of 
the liable parent; there is no consideration 
of or adjustment for any care provided 
directly by that parent up to 40% of nights; 
the receiving parent faces no constraints as 
to the use of the funds received, whether 
on the child or for other purposes; 
conversely, the paying parent has no say 
as to how the funds are used; and there is 
no accountability, ex post, for the use of 
child support received. No explanation 
has been given for the choice of formula, 
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which could bear little relationship to the 
actual costs of the children.
Nevertheless, in 2001 it was stated 
on the IRD Child Support web page 
that: ‘Child Support is governed by the 
objectives set out in the Child Support 
Act 1991’ (Birks, 2001). By 2008 this had 
been changed to read:
The child support scheme operates 
under the Child Support Act 1991. This 
legislation aims to ensure that:
• parents take financial 
responsibility for their 
children when marriages and 
relationships end
• financial contributions from 
paying parents help to offset the 
cost of benefits, like the Domestic 
Purposes Benefit, which support 
custodians and children. (Inland 
Revenue Department, 2008)
Even this demonstrates a contradiction 
if a custodian is on the DPB, in that liable 
parents’ contributions are then diverted 
from the child via the government so as 
to support the custodian. 
These problems have been signalled 
directly over many years by those affected 
by the legislation. Peter Dunne states, ‘I 
note that over a quarter of the letters I 
receive as Minister of Revenue are from 
people who are unhappy with some aspect 
of the child support scheme’ (Dunne, 
2010, foreword). The consultation 
document attempts to address some of 
these issues. In particular, it focuses on 
(i) measuring the costs of children, (ii) 
broader provision to consider shared 
care, and (iii) consideration of the 
incomes of both parents. In addition to 
the consultation document, Claus et al. 
(2009) gave details of the calculations 
of costs of children. This is important 
because no explanation was given for the 
choice of percentages used in the formula 
in the Act. The approach taken was 
based on that used in Australia (Percival 
and Harding, 2005). It is therefore an 
illustration of international transmission 
of methods of analysis. Given the 
similarity of proposed solutions, it is also 
an example of international transmission 
of policy. 
The proposed formula
Dunne (2010) discusses a range of issues 
and proposals, drawing on the results 
from Claus et al. (2009) to present a 
possible alternative child support formula. 
Notable changes are the linking of formula 
assessments to estimated costs of children, 
consideration of the incomes of both 
parents, and extended adjustments for 
shared care. This section treats the cost 
estimates as if they are correct, considering 
the proposals on that basis. The following 
section discusses measurement problems.
Until now it had not been known how 
child support was intended to be used, or 
if it was intended to cover the full costs 
of a child. There had been occasional 
comments about the money being ‘for 
the child’, public claims that not enough 
is being given because many parents are 
assessed at the minimum obligation to 
the detriment of children, and criticism 
of the high levels of arrears and debt. 
A major observation by Dunne (2010, 
pp.50-1) is that the current child support 
formula is close to or, for households on 
low income or with one child under 13 in 
particular, in excess of the estimated cost 
of a child (net of government funding 
such as Working for Families). It is all 
paid by the liable parent, so the costs are 
not shared, tax benefits are not shared, 
generally all going solely to the main 
caregiver, and any voluntary payments 
or costs incurred directly by the liable 
parent are (with limited review provision) 
additional to the child support obligation 
and ignored in the calculations. 
There is no awareness of this apparent 
over-payment. Instead, political and 
media attention has promoted the view 
of fathers (rather than liable parents) 
shirking their responsibilities by paying 
the minimum or being in debt to 
Child Support (Keith, 2010). Additional 
information obtained under the Official 
Information Act challenges this view. 
According to these numbers, in 2010 
(March year) there were 177,600 liable 
parents. Of these, 79,300 (44.7%) were 
assessed at the minimum rate. However, 
73% of female liable parents were on 
the minimum rate, compared to 38% of 
male liable parents. About 18.6% of liable 
parents were female, and, despite the high 
prevalence of minimum assessment for 
them, 16.5% of liable parents with debt 
were female. 101,500 custodians were on 
a benefit, with liable parent contributions 
diverted from the child to the custodian. 
Of the liable parents on the minimum 
payment, 50,200 (63%) were associated 
with a custodian on a benefit. Hence, 
nearly two-thirds of liable parents on a 
minimum are linked to custodians on 
benefits, so their low payments would have 
little effect on the recipient household. 
Others may be minimally affected also. As 
noted by Dunne (2010, p.26), Working for 
Families tax credits exceed the ‘estimated 
expenditure for raising children’ for many 
on low income, especially if they qualify 
for the in-work tax credit, in which case 
net costs are negative up to an annual 
income of about $35,000.
The reason for the review is given as 
changed circumstances, including the 
claim, ‘The primary assumption under 
the current scheme is that the paying 
parent is the sole income earner and 
that the receiving parent is the main care 
provider’ (Dunne, 2010, p.2). There was 
an earlier review headed by Judge Peter 
Trapski (Child Support Act Working 
Party, 1994; Trapski, 1994). This gave a 
different explanation of the disregard 
for the custodial parent’s income, 
suggesting that the Act was designed to 
achieve labour market objectives not 
mentioned in the Act. On consideration 
of the custodial parent’s income the 1994 
consultative document states:
The analysis in the review is based on a limited range 
of circumstances. Comparisons are between intact 
two-adult households, both adults 25 or over, with and 
without children. 
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a strong disincentive to workforce 
participation could result if every 
dollar earned by the custodian over a 
given threshold resulted in a decrease 
in child support. As 84% of lone 
parents are women, structural gender 
based inequities in the labour market 
could be worsened. (Child Support 
Act Working Party, 1994, p.24)
Note that, for liable parents, extra 
income above the threshold and below 
the ceiling results in increased child 
support. 
Child support is not the only area 
of law influenced by gender-political 
considerations. The above quote 
illustrates the possibility that, even when 
legislation is presented in gender neutral 
language, a classification highly correlated 
with gender may be used for gendered 
objectives. Child support may not have 
been intended purely for the support of 
children. 
The analysis in the review is based 
on a limited range of circumstances. 
Comparisons are between intact two-
adult households, both adults 25 or over, 
with and without children. It is assumed 
that:
• the child support obligation arises 
due to the separation of two parents 
(they had lived together)
• the parents continue to earn at 
the same rate as they did before 
(assessment is based on combined 
current incomes)
• there are no changes in level of family 
tax credits as a result of separation, 
although such credits can be 
substantial, especially for low-income 
households with several children
• repartnering and additional 
dependants have no effect on 
obligations
• the desirable objective is to maintain 
the living standard of the child as 
before separation
• this can best be achieved through the 
specified child support allocation. 
An online survey conducted as part 
of the consultation asked whether child 
support should be a fixed sum or income 
related. The proposed formula was 
then based on income and the full cost 
of children. There was no partial cost 
option. 
Given that the result is transfer of 
money from a liable parent to a recipient 
parent, child support determines not 
only financial contributions, but also the 
right to decide how the funds are used. 
Consequently, it is a redistribution of 
property rights, or power and decision-
making authority, from the earner to 
the recipient. Currently, if a liable parent 
cares for a child for less than 40% of 
nights, then that parent has no say as to 
how the child support is used, and has 
to cover directly incurred costs over and 
above contributions already made. 
Dunne makes clear that, in the 
proposed formula, expenditure for raising 
children should come from Working for 
Families tax credits plus contributions by 
both parents according to their income, 
some of this to be incurred directly and 
the rest to be transferred from one parent 
to the other as child support. Payment 
would still confer no say, each parent 
having full discretion as to the use of the 
money at their disposal. 
The issue of shared care received 
attention, with a proposed consideration 
of care less than 40% of nights. Dunne 
(2010, p.19) describes the additional 
costs arising from the care of children in 
two households. Referring to Australian 
findings, households with a modest 
living standard and 20% of the care 
are estimated to experience 38% of the 
costs of a sole parent with 100% of the 
care. This rises to 60% for a ‘low-cost’ 
household. Surprisingly, the other parent 
with 80% of care still incurs 99% of the 
full-time costs. This is explained in terms 
of savings in costs such as food being 
balanced by higher travel costs incurred 
by the recipient parent due to shared care 
(Henman et al., 2007, pp.22-3), although 
this is minimal for parents living in close 
proximity. It is not mentioned, but there 
are also likely to be more activity costs 
at weekends than on weekdays, and 
number of nights may not reflect the 
amount of time spent with a child. The 
Australian result is obtained from an 
itemised cost approach. Taking a living 
standard measure as in Claus et al. (2009) 
and described in the next section, an 
improvement over full-time care would 
be recorded in the main carer household 
due to the smaller share of food costs in 
total expenditure.
Comparisons of shared care formulae 
between the existing Australian and UK 
systems and the proposed New Zealand 
scheme, described in Dunne (2010, 
pp.32-3), are presented in Figure 1.
The diagonal line indicates where 
share of child support equals share of 
nights, while points below the line indicate 
under-allocation. Except for near-equal 
sharing, the parent with less care has a 
less-than-proportionate share of child 
support for almost the entire range, but 
for a short range under the Australian 
formula. This is despite the more-than-
proportionate costs incurred and the lack 
of eligibility for tax benefits. For most of 
the range, the New Zealand proposal is 
the least equal. As child support income 
is calculated after deduction of the 
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Figure 1: Percentage Share of Child Support by Percentage of Nights
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living allowance, any percentage split in 
contribution is disproportionately drawn 
from the higher earner, increasingly so 
as the living allowance rises. The current 
New Zealand formula draws on only one 
income and follows the horizontal axis to 
40, after which there is some adjustment 
based on relative incomes. It is perhaps 
understandable that liable parents may 
be resentful if they make substantial 
child support contributions and also 
share care. It is also understandable that 
some might find this unsustainable. It is 
telling that, in one court case concerning 
an application for recognition of 
substantial equal sharing, the judge 
ruled against recognition largely on the 
grounds that the liable parent, who was 
paying assessed child support and direct 
costs for substantial care, only grudgingly 
contributed even further funds (Johns v 
CIR, 1999).
Estimating the costs of children
This section considers the cost estimates 
derived in Claus et al. (2009) and 
applied in Dunne (2010). The process 
followed can be described in terms of 
(a) selecting the data, (b) estimating 
expenditure (equation 1), (c) calculating 
the expenditure–standard of living 
relationship (equation 2), and (d) using 
equation 2 to estimate costs of children 
as the extra expenditure required for a 
constant living standard.
Selecting the data
The data were taken from the Household 
Economic Survey for 2006–2007 and 
were restricted to two-adult and two-
adult-with-children households. These 
comprised 57% of all households. That 
would give a total of 1,454 observations 
from the survey. Only 930 returns were 
considered usable, meaning that 36% were 
rejected. Some exclusions would have 
occurred as a result of both adults being 
aged 60 or over, but a large proportion 
must have been due to specified 
problems with data, namely: zero or 
negative expenditure; food expenditure 
greater than total expenditure; zero or 
negative income; or expenditure greater 
than twice income. These reasons suggest 
either problems in the rejected data or, 
for the latter two, annual data perhaps 
not identifying fluctuations in income or 
expenditure over time. In any event, the 
apparently high rejection rate suggests 
that much of the data would have been 
inaccurate. This raises the question: if 
there are clear inaccuracies in so much 
of the data, how much confidence can be 
placed in the data that were not rejected?
Estimating expenditure
Equation 1, the household expenditure 
equation, is as follows:
Ei = α1Yi + α2(Yi)2 + α3Ages(1)i + ... 
+ α6Ages(4)i + ei
E is expenditure and Y is income, both 
weekly, in thousands of dollars. Ages(1) 
to Ages(4) are the number of household 
members aged, respectively, 0–12, 13–18, 
19–24 and 25 or over. A modified version 
of this equation, Equation 3, does not 
distinguish between Age(1) and Age(2), 
thus simplifying consideration of 
situations with more than one child, but 
preventing inclusion of variation in cost 
due to age of children. Claus et al. use 
this latter equation for their subsequent 
analysis. The current discussion focuses 
on Equation 1, but similar points apply 
to both equations.
The choice of variables and 
specification of functional form 
are important determinants of the 
resulting outputs. This is common to all 
estimation, but its significance is often 
overlooked in econometrics, as when 
including ‘control variables’, or failing to 
recognise the importance of aggregation 
by time, with or without lags being 
considered. 
Note that in this equation the only 
impact of household size is a fixed 
increase in expenditure per person, with 
the actual sum depending on the age 
category of the individual. In particular, 
the impact is independent of household 
income, and there are no differences 
between the impact of the first and 
the tenth person in any age group. The 
first and any additional child under 
13 is estimated to increase household 
expenditure by $19 per week. This can 
be viewed in relation to an estimated 
total weekly expenditure of $958 for a 
couple-and-child household on $1,365 
income per week. 
Nevertheless, a large amount of 
the expenditure depends solely on 
household composition ($360 per week 
for a household with a young child, and 
$405 with a child aged 13–18). This results 
in average changes in expenditure out 
of extra income of 45% for an income 
rise from $0 to $704, 43% for an income 
rise from $704 to $1,365, and 39% for 
an income rise from $1,369 to $2,838, all 
independent of household composition. 
There is no constant in the equation, 
but most households in the sample will 
have two people in the Ages(4) category, 
which may therefore approximate a 
constant. Expenditure is based on current 
income, so there is no consideration of 
life-cycle spending patterns, for example. 
Given different possible behaviours by, 
say, intending first home buyers, childless 
career couples and retired couples, the 
assumption of the same underlying 
relationship for all may be unrealistic. 
While this equation was estimated 
using the full selected sample, results 
were used only to estimate the 
There are marked differences if estimates are based 
on both adults being under 25, with the younger 
household spending $120 per week less at all income 
levels. If the wrong relationship has been chosen, then 
resulting estimates will be misleading. 
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expenditure of couple households with 
one child under 19. The estimates are 
also restricted to couples both 25 or 
older. There are marked differences if 
estimates are based on both adults being 
under 25, with the younger household 
spending $120 per week less at all income 
levels. If the wrong relationship has been 
chosen, then resulting estimates will be 
misleading.
Calculating the expenditure–standard of 
living relationship
The study requires the estimation of 
the following living standards equation, 
Equation 2, in which LS stands for living 
standard and F represents family size:
LSi = β1ln(Ei/Fi) + β2(ln(Ei/Fi))2 
+ β3ln(Fi) + β4(Ages(1)i/Fi) + ... 
+ β7(Ages(4)i/Fi) + µi
This is paired with Equation 1. Just as 
that equation has an alternative Equation 
3, there is a corresponding Equation 4 for 
situations with more than one child. 
The LS measure is central to the 
study. It is taken to be the percentage 
share of total expenditure comprised 
by a subset of categories (food at home, 
non-durable household supplies and 
services, communication equipment and 
services and personal care products and 
services), expressed as a natural log. Any 
two households with the same value for 
this measure are considered to have the 
same living standard, with lower values 
indicating higher living standards. It 
is questionable why such a measure is 
considered a satisfactory measure for 
comparison over household types and 
income levels. While, for any individual 
household, a fall in the share might 
reflect a rise in living standard, it may be 
wrong to assume that comparisons across 
households are equally meaningful. 
There may be many other determinants 
of lifestyle that have not been considered 
in this analysis. Some specific potential 
distortions can be imagined. In particular, 
there may be systematic differences 
in lifestyle according to size and age 
composition of households which affect 
both the level and composition of 
household expenditure. It is also not clear 
why the functional form for the equation 
was chosen, and with an R2 of 0.1533 
(Claus, et al., 2009, p.20) its explanatory 
power is weak. 
Following the Australian methodology, 
Claus et al. (2009) have additional 
equations 3 and 4 to calculate costs for 
households with more than one child. 
They are slight variants of equations 1 
and 2 and combine the two child age 
groups. Living standards by household 
composition and income as calculated by 
equations 3 and 4 are given in Table 1, with 
an additional row for no-child households. 
They are presented as percentages of 
household expenditure. Low income 
is $704 per week, and middle and high 
incomes are $1,365 and $2,838 respectively. 
It can be seen that a middle-income 
childless household could almost halve its 
income to $704 per week and still be on 
a higher living standard than a middle-
income household with two children. A 
high-income no-child household could 
cut its income by 75% and still be on a 
higher living standard than a four-child 
household on the same income. In fact, 
using equation 1, a weekly income of 
$485 and associated expenditure of $563 
would give an equivalent living standard 
to a four-child household on $2,838 with 
expenditure of $1,638 per week. It is on 
this basis that a weekly cost of children 
figure of $1,075 is determined. It means 
that, according to the model, a four-child 
household on an annual income of nearly 
$150,000 is on the same living standard as 
a couple on just over $25,000.
The difference in these numbers going 
down the columns or across the rows is not 
very large. This suggests two things. First, 
living standards may not vary very much 
according to this measure, and second, 
large expenditure differences may be 
required to compensate for any measured 
LS difference due to the presence of 
children. Moreover, the estimates are not 
precise, so small differences may not be 
significant. It could also be imagined that 
data definition, lifestyle, wealth, stage 
of life or other differences could have 
a greater impact than changes in the 
included explanatory variables. 
Additional problems with the 
measure can be identified. The treatment 
of housing costs in expenditure can 
give misleading results. Interest is 
included in the expenditure measure, 
but capital repayments are not. Consider 
a household with a fixed expenditure 
pattern, including mortgage payments 
(interest plus capital). Over time, the 
interest component declines and capital 
repayments increase. Consequently, 
total measured expenditure is declining. 
There is no change to the expenditure 
in the subset categories, so measured 
living standard would be declining (LS is 
rising) although there is no change to the 
actual living standard, and the household 
is becoming wealthier. The failure 
to recognise implicit rent to owner-
occupiers is equally distorting. Consider 
one household that is a mortgage-free 
owner-occupier, and another that is 
renting, with non-rent expenditures 
Table 1: Living Standard (percentage of expenditure allocated to designated sub-basket of 
goods)
Low-income 
household
Middle-income 
household
High-income 
household
Average-income 
household
No child 21.22 18.56 14.63 17.92
1 child 22.57 20.61 17.23 20.10
2 children 23.57 22.15 19.28 21.74
3 children 24.31 23.32 20.91 23.00
4 children 24.87 24.23 22.24 23.98
The treatment of housing costs in expenditure can 
give misleading results. Interest is included in the 
expenditure measure, but capital repayments are not.
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equal. The household that is renting 
would be considered to have a higher 
standard of living due to the higher total 
expenditure.
The costs of children
The cost of children is estimated as the 
difference in estimated expenditures of a 
household with children compared to a 
two-adult household on the same living 
standard. Taking the living standard 
calculated as in Table 1, Equation 2 (or 
Equation 4) is solved for E assuming two 
adults only.
The choice of E/F in Equation 2 is 
puzzling. It suggests that living standard 
is a function of per capita expenditure, 
although an extensive literature on 
household equivalence measures suggests 
that there are economies of scale in 
households, and children cost less than 
adults. Hence, for example, the Jensen 
Equivalised Annual Household Income 
for a two-adult-plus-child household on 
an income of $35,000 would be equivalent 
to a two-adult household on $29,400 
(Statistics New Zealand, undated). By 
this measure, a child increases required 
income by 19%. In contrast, a per capita 
measure, lacking economies of scale 
or differential adjustment for children, 
requires an expenditure increase of 50%. 
The significance of this is indicated 
with a truncated version of Equation 
2 considering only the E/F terms. To 
equalise LS, it is then only necessary 
to equalise the expenditure variables. 
(The result is therefore independent of 
the sample or the estimation method.) 
With per capita expenditure, a fall in 
couple-plus-child expenditure of 33% 
would give the required couple-only 
expenditure. With the Jensen measure, 
a fall of 0.19/1.19, or 16%, would achieve 
the same result. In other words, for the 
truncated equation this change halves the 
estimated cost of a child. This suggests 
that, by ignoring economies of scale and 
shared consumption, the approach may 
overstate the costs of children in the full 
model, perhaps by a large margin.
Results may be sensitive to other 
aspects of the model. Taking adults 
under 25, rather than 25 or over, has been 
shown to affect expenditure estimates. It 
also affects estimated costs of children, as 
shown in Table 2, drawn from Equations 
1 and 2. As can be seen, there is a marked 
difference in results, with under-25 results 
being surprisingly high.
Coefficient estimation can be 
confounded by multicollinearity, in which 
case the effects of changes in the value of 
a variable may not reflect precisely the 
response to that variable, rather than other, 
statistically-related influences. It should 
also be noted that coefficient estimates 
are not precise. The interpretation of 
results and the use of significance testing 
in general has been challenged in several 
publications, some of which are widely 
known (McCloskey, 1998; Ziliak and 
McCloskey, 2008). Without rejecting the 
estimation method in its entirety, it is 
possible to consider the effects of slight 
changes in the values of the estimated 
coefficients. Table 3 presents cost-of-child 
figures from Equations 1 and 2 with adults 
over 24. The coefficients for Age(1) and 
Age(2) in Equation 2 are changed by plus 
and minus 0.2 standard errors, relatively 
small adjustments. It can be seen that 
these have a major effect on estimated 
costs of children. The +0.2SE figures are 
all more than a third of total household 
expenditure, suggesting diseconomies of 
scale!
In summary, the estimated costs 
of children are imprecise, and are 
highly sensitive to the assumptions and 
parameter values. Small changes in these 
can produce large changes in results. 
However, if the results are accepted, big 
changes in expenditure are required to 
produce small changes in LS. Rather 
than the quantitative analyses providing 
robust and strongly supported measures, 
they may serve more of a rhetorical 
purpose, lending authority to figures 
which, while only poorly supported, 
may appear convincing. This is likely in 
particular if the values presented appear, 
a priori, plausible. However, as is shown 
above, there are some results provided 
by the model that may be less widely 
acceptable. 
An additional problem is the meaning 
of the figures. Despite the analysis, it is 
still not clear what the money is for. 
Consequently, it would be hard to hold 
a recipient parent accountable for its use. 
One explanation given for taking the 
living standards approach is that it is not 
possible to separate out expenditure on 
individuals within a household (Claus et 
al., 2009). Much is intermingled, so certain 
uses of the money will benefit others in 
the household. However, it cannot then 
be assumed that an allocation of the 
estimated sum to a particular household 
would give the desired living standard for 
the child(ren) in that household, regardless 
of the overall household income. In the 
extreme, it is hard to see how a child’s 
Table 2: Costs of One Child under 13, by Age of Parents
Low-income 
household
Middle-income 
household
High-income 
household
Average-income 
household
Adults 25+ $147 $243 $426 $268
Adults <25 $308 $356 $551 $381
Table 3: Cost of Child, Adjusting the Age Coefficient in the LS Equation
Low-income 
household
Middle-income 
household
High-income 
household
Average-income 
household
Child <13
Age(1) + 0.2SE $246 $339 $533 $365
Age(1) $147 $243 $426 $268
Age(1) – 0.2SE $73 $169 $342 $193
Child 13+
Age(2) + 0.2SE $296 $388 $585 $414
Age(2) $196 $291 $477 $316
Age(2) – 0.2SE $90 $183 $355 $207
An Assessment of Proposed Changes to the Child Support Formula
Policy Quarterly – Volume 7, Issue 1 – February 2011 – Page 37
living standard can be maintained with a 
high-earning liable parent and a recipient 
parent on the DPB. 
Broader issues and an alternative proposal
The consultation and proposals are 
narrowly focused on the child support 
formula. Issues of context and unstated 
assumptions are important. Some of these 
are beyond the scope of this paper, such as 
the decision to have children and associated 
choice of roles, or whether one adult has 
raised or lowered the living standard 
of the other due to their relationship or 
due to entry into their relationship. A 
core assumption in the consultation is: ‘if 
children are not to share in the decreased 
living standard that necessarily results 
from the costs of parents living apart, then 
child support payments should be based 
on previous expenditure on children in 
the intact family’ (Claus et al., 2009, p.8). 
For a reframing of this point, Braver and 
O’Connell quote a judge: ‘[I]f we’re really 
so concerned about the child’s standard of 
living, why don’t we just typically award 
custody, when it’s in dispute, to the parent 
with the higher income?’ (Braver and 
O’Connell, 1998, p.86). This is not the only 
unstated issue.
A potentially important aspect 
affecting co-operation and compliance 
is that of power and control. Implicit 
in the lack of controls on the use of 
funds is an assumption of full trust in 
recipient parents to use all the designated 
funds from all sources correctly. This 
is despite both the abnormal spending 
pattern required to maintain differential 
living standards within a household 
and the choice to take the DPB, thereby 
redirecting a large proportion of the 
dedicated funds away from the child. 
Conversely, there is no trust in liable 
parents, with the full estimated costs of 
children being assigned by the formula 
and no say being awarded to that parent 
in the use of the funds. Framing of issues 
is important, and it has been argued 
(Birks, 2008) that current representations 
are narrowly focused, in part due to the 
dominance of a women’s rights discourse. 
An unbalanced child support regime can 
damage relations between parents and 
between parents and children. 
Although there have been suggestions 
to the contrary, data suggest that children 
generally lose the parenting input of one 
parent when their parents live apart. 
Hence, ‘[a]s at 31 March 2009, 7,976 
children and 6,950 parental relationships 
were covered by a qualifying shared 
care arrangement, representing 3.9% of 
children and 4.6% of relationships in the 
child support scheme’ (Dunne, 2010, p.28, 
fn.25). Resentment under the current 
system may be understandable when it is 
viewed according to one extreme framing. 
The comparison has been suggested of 
liable parents and parents of the ‘stolen 
generation’ in Australia. According to 
this reasoning, not only are liable parents 
denied parenting relationships with their 
children, but they are also then required 
to pay for them. 
Despite the exclusion of the liable 
parent, the current rhetoric is that, 
‘One of the Government’s key social 
policy objectives is to ensure that New 
Zealanders have an equal opportunity to 
participate in and contribute to society’ 
(Dunne, 2010, p.6). The problem is denied, 
but it may be a factor in child support 
compliance, and in collection costs which 
have been estimated for New Zealand at 
nearly 19c per dollar (Shephard, 2006). 
An alternative proposal could be built 
on a more balanced view of the roles and 
motivations of child support payer and 
payee. Consider, for example, the following 
middle-of-the road presumptions: 
• both (biological) parents have an 
interest in the well-being of their 
children 
• a recipient parent may not spend as 
assumed in the legislation, as this 
is based on an abnormal spending 
pattern with no guidelines or 
monitoring 
• a paying parent would willingly make 
contributions to the cost of a child 
when allowed some control of the use 
of the funds. 
On that basis, instead of attempting 
to include the full costs of children 
within the child support formula, a more 
moderate child support system could 
be designed so as to provide a ‘safety 
net’. Under such a system, only part of 
the costs are covered by the legislation. 
This would equate to a redistribution 
of somewhat fewer property rights 
from the liable parent to the recipient, 
while leaving the remainder of the costs 
of the children to be covered through 
voluntary contributions by either or 
both parents. Consequently, there would 
be a more balanced power allocation 
between the parents, with each having 
some discretion. This is likely to result in 
less resentment, more recognition of the 
contributions of the paying parent, and 
each parent having an incentive and a 
greater ability to maintain good relations 
with the other. A possible outcome would 
be improved co-operation and agreement 
between the parents. 
Partial coverage of costs could also 
be justified on the basis of uncertainty 
about the true costs of children, along 
with other reasons for concern about 
the recipient parent’s use of funds and 
the under-recognition of direct costs to 
liable parents. A simple modification 
to the formula proposed in Supporting 
Children would be to halve the assessed 
figures. This is likely to: (i) greatly reduce 
the existing need for an unattainably 
accurate estimate of costs of children, 
(ii) increase accountability in use of 
money for children by both parents, (iii) 
encourage greater communication and 
co-operation by parents on a more level 
In summary, it is clear that costs may vary markedly 
across households according to circumstances and 
lifestyles. Any estimates of costs will be subject to 
large error. 
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playing field, and (iv) reduce resentment 
by liable parents, increasing voluntary 
compliance and hence reducing collection 
costs.
Conclusions
In summary, it is clear that costs may vary 
markedly across households according to 
circumstances and lifestyles. Any estimates 
of costs will be subject to large error. In 
addition, even in the proposed formula 
tax benefits are unrepresentatively 
allocated and incurred costs incorrectly 
acknowledged. Perhaps the most 
significant findings are that: the intention 
is to operate a system that attempts to 
rule on the funding of these costs in 
their entirety; government funding can 
provide a substantial component of the 
amount going to the main caregiver; the 
total funding may be set according to an 
unrealistically high living standard for the 
children; costs incurred by the caregiver 
with less time are relatively under-
acknowledged; the payers (including 
government) have no rights over the use 
of the money paid; and the system results 
in a major power imbalance and potential 
source of conflict, with enforcement and 
penalty provision for child support payers 
but no constraints or even guidelines 
for payees. It should not be surprising if 
such a system results in conflict between 
child support payer and payee, and in 
administration problems.
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